Deradicalisation of Boko Haram Insurgents and Bandits: A Soft-power Approach in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract

Insecurity has made the state government unproductive, aggressive, and unable to protect its citizens and territory. Insurgency activities like Boko Haram and banditry are common in the sub-Saharan region, particularly in Nigeria, Lake Chad, Cameroon, and the Niger Republic. The perpetrators of these numerous crises have notably targeted victims and state institutions in northern Nigeria. These incessant attacks have stimulated a deradicalization response; however, despite the deradicalization measures to end the Boko Haram insurgency and banditry, the attacks still continue unabated. It raises concerns about the effectiveness of the deradicalization strategy against insurgencies. This brings to the fore the importance of soft power deradicalization strategies such as pardoning, socio-economic empowerment, and re-integration of insurgents and bandits into society. Although the soft-power deradicalization initiative often draws attention and commendation, it also raises doubts about sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on the theory of deradicalization and the systematic qualitative method, this article examines a soft-power deradicalization strategy against Boko Haram and banditry insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa. The findings expand discussion on the dimensions of deradicalization strategy and its potential in promoting positive outcomes against insurgency in sub-Saharan Africa. It suggests the deployment of soft power as a deradicalization strategy to locally tackle insurgency in Sub-Saharan Africa.