From Uncertainty to Strategic Failure: U.S. Military Interventions and the Complexity of Nation-Building in Afghanistan

Abstract

The American occupation of Afghanistan from 2001-2021 is widely regarded as a strategic failure, particularly after the Taliban took over the government in 2021. This work seeks to observe the strategic flaws of the 20-year occupation from the perspective of nation-building within the state. Using the theoretical lens of strategic culture and borrowing from Huntington’s discourse on the clash of civilizations, this article notes that nation-building failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to the ideological differences between the West and the Middle East. Using a descriptive qualitative approach and secondary sources such as books and peer-reviewed articles, the study employs thematic analysis to identify key areas of strategic flaws. The findings highlight three major areas of concern: strategic miscalculation and mission creep, over-militarization and over-reliance on hard power, and the hasty withdrawal of troops in 2021 without creating sustainable nation-building structures in Afghanistan. These flaws culminated in the Taliban’s take-over weeks after the U.S. exit from Afghanistan. In line with these findings, the study recommends that future strategies should incorporate the local culture of the native population into nation-building efforts, and it should have well-defined goals and exit timelines in order to prevent strategic failure, as in the case of Afghanistan.